Stéphan Sémirat, Maître de conférences UGA, Chercheur au GAEL

Le séminaire GAEL du 19 septembre 2024 est animé par Stéphan Sémirat.

Stéphan a soutenu sa thèse en Economie en 2018 au GAEL et a ensuite été Professeur Associé à la Faculté d'Economie de Grenoble.

A compter du 1^er octobre 2024, il est Maître de conférences à l'Université Grenoble Alpes et Chercheur au GAEL.

• Economie de l'information
• Jeux de signaux

Titre de sa présentation : Referential and Conative Message Uses in Cheap Talk Games: an Experiment.

Résumé : Standard economic models hardly deal with the meaning of the messages possibly used in interactions between conflicting agents (because talk is cheap, messages are interchangeable). By contrast, the field of linguistic studies how expectations draw inferences from the semantic content and the context of a statement, but often assumes cooperation between the agents.
In this work, we ask if messages used in a cheap talk game might be given a meaning, and if that meaning might be related to the existence of a conflict between the agents.
To answer this question, we conducted two laboratory experiments in a between-subjects design, with two treatments by experiment.
In the first experiment, we tested for the emergence of a referential or conative function (Jakobson, 1963) of the messages used in a cheap game, controlling for the existence of a conflict between the players.
In the second experiment, we tested if, reciprocally, an imposed referential or conative function of the messages used favors one of the players in case of conflict.
First analysis suggest that meaning might be related to strategic aspects of the interaction.
The sender might strategically favor a conative function for the message use, whereas the receiver might strategically favor a referential function, especially when the other player is not acting strategically.

Le séminaire a lieu à 13h30 en salle 227.