Séminaire interne Sayan Murkherjee, Chercheur Post-Doc

13 octobre 2026
Sayan Mukherjee, Chercheur Post-Doc
 

Titre de sa présentation : Ambiguity, Learning, and Coordination in Global Games

Résumé : We study a finite population of optimists and pessimists who interact in a two-action global game under ambiguity about the fundamentals. We characterize the set of Choquet-Nash equilibria of the game when players evaluate their actions using neo-additive capacities. In particular, we show that six types of equilibria can arise: complete investment (CIE), complete abstention (CAE), segregation (SE), optimistic mixing (OME), pessimistic mixing (PME), and mixed (ME). We then introduce the notion of a Choquet-logit Markov chain derived from the logit best-response protocol in the underlying global game. We show that when ambiguity is sufficiently high, the unique invariant measure of this chain concentrates, in the small-noise limit, only on CIE, CAE, or SE, depending on the effective fundamentals for optimists and pessimists. We also establish that when objective information about the fundamental arrives, the invariant measure concentrates, under vanishing ambiguity and in the small-noise limit, only on CIE or CAE, the two coordination equilibria of the game, depending on the value of the true mean of the fundamental.

 
Le séminaire a lieu à 11h30, au GAEL.