Bruno Lanz, Professeur d'économie appliquée à l'Université de Neuchâtel

Le cycle des séminaires GAEL 2024-2025 débute le 5 septembre.

Pour le premier séminaire de cette nouvelle année universitaire, nous avons le plaisir d'accueillir, Bruno Lanz, Professeur d'économie appliquée à l'Université de Neuchâtel et membre de la faculté externe du Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research du MIT. 

• Economie publique ;
• Econométrie appliquée ;
• Economie comportementale et expérimentale.

voir son CV

Titre de sa présentation : Incentives, Norms, and Information: Theory and Evidence from CO2 Abatement.

Résumé : This paper investigates how incentives, norms, and information interact in addressing externalities, using both theoretical and experimental methods. Our analysis begins with the well-established premise that people's behaviors are shaped by a combination of extrinsic motivation, such as financial rewards, and intrinsic motivation, such as adherence to injunctive norms (Deci and Ryan, 1985). The relative importance of these motivations shifts with individuals’ perceptions of the decision-making context. When people are unaware of the external costs or benefits of their actions, they view the context as morally neutral and respond to financial incentives. However, once informed about the broader implications of their actions, their decisions are guided not only by extrinsic rewards but also by intrinsic motivations, like the desire to follow injunctive norms. Perception is also influenced by the type of policy in place. The presence of monetary incentives, for instance, can serve as a contextual cue that people use to infer appropriate behaviors, potentially counteracting the other contextual features (Vohs et al., 2006).
Our theoretical framework synthesizes two prominent models in the literature: the model of prosocial behaviors (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) and the model of context-dependent preferences (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2010). We then conduct a set of experiments to manipulate decision-making contexts and empirically document theoretical results. We build on the widely-used “Click for Charity” framework (Amir and Ariely, 2008; Ariely et al., 2009; Berger and Pope, 2011), a computerized real-effort task, and contrast how effort is driven by purely intrinsic motivation, purely extrinsic motivation, or a combination of both. The experimental design enables us to systematically isolate and analyze the roles of incentives and information under the possible influence of norm-based appeals, providing novel insights into how they interact in shifting contexts.

Le séminaire a lieu à 13h30 en salle EG01.