Ce mardi au GAEL : Stéphan Sémirat, Maître de conférence UGA

Selecting equilibria in single peaked, single crossing sender-receiver cheap talk games with finitely many types 

Mardi 2 décembre 2025, Stéphan Sémirat

Résumé : I study perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) in single peaked, single crossing, sender-receiver games with finitely many types for the sender. I introduce a refinement of Mailath et al's (1993) undefeated equilibrium, by restricting off-path beliefs to sets of types identified by a non-deterministic truth-imitating process. Accordingly, a candidate equilibrium fails to satisfy the No Incentive To Truth Imitate (NITTI) criterion if at least one type has a strict incentive to deviate by initially pretending to be truthful but ultimately being identified through the process. NITTI selects a single PBE outcome.
 

Le séminaire a lieu à 13h00 en salle 227.