Nahed Eddai présente ses travaux de recherche

en visio

La série de séminaires FETS propose aujourd'hui une nouvelle formule : les PhD Talks.

Dans le cadre d'un PhD Talk, deux étudiants en dernière année de doctorat présentent le document de travail le plus prometteur issu de leur thèse. Chaque exposé dure une demi-heure, discussion comprise.

Pour ce premier PhD talks, Nahed Eddai, du laboratoire GAEL et Gabriel Bayle du laboratoire CEE-M présenteront leurs travaux :

Nahed présentera "Measuring beliefs and ambiguity attitudes in a public good game: an experimental study".

Abstract:
This paper reports an experimental study where I elicit subjects' beliefs and ambiguity attitudes about the contributions of their opponents to the public good, allowing for perceptions of strategic ambiguity. The results indicate that subjects perceive the contributions of their opponents as ambiguous and they are non neutral to such ambiguity. Subjects' ambiguity attitudes and beliefs both influence their decisions to contribute to the public good. Subjects who are more ambiguity averse contribute less, and subjects with more optimistic beliefs about others' contributions contribute a higher amount to the public good. I attempt also through this experiment to compare strategic ambiguity to exogenous ambiguity. The results prove that ambiguity has a bigger impact in the public good game than in the Ellsberg experiment. I find that subjects' ambiguity attitudes appear to be context dependent: within subjects, ambiguity attitudes vary considerably with the type of decision and the partner in the interaction.

Gabriel présentera "The approval mechanism with delegation: An experiment on CPR extractions", joint work withS. Farolfi, E. Lavaine and M. Willinger.

Abstract:
We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, a variant of the approval mechanism (AM) in a three-player common pool resource (CPR) game. The novelty lies in the disapproval rule: in case of disapproval, in stage 2, one of the players is randomly selected to choose authoritatively the uniform level of extraction for the group, between the minimum and the maximum of the stage 1 proposals, putting the disapproval arbitration at an endogenous level. Backwards elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS) predicts the socially optimum level of extraction under unanimity, but not under majority. Our experimental findings show that the AM with the delegation disapproval benchmark strongly reduces extractions and that most of the randomly selected delegates choose the optimal extraction.

La conférence aura lieu à 12h15.

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