Nicolas Pasquier, Chargé de recherche INRAE

Le séminaire du jeudi 21 novembre 2024 est animé par Nicolas Pasquier, Chargé de recherche INRAE au Laboratoire GAEL.

Titre de sa présentation : Winners and Losers of Gatekeeper-Induced Consumer Preference Distortion in Promoting Personalized Pricing.

Résumé : We present a model of duopoly competition between sellers on a gatekeeper platform with a Hotelling segment of consumers. Sellers have access to consumer data and must choose between quoting personalized or uniform prices, knowing they will have to pay a per-unit fee to the gatekeeper upon price personalization. To promote its personalized pricing service, the gatekeeper may have an incentive to bias its recommendation or search algorithms. Specifically, a greater brand mix provides more incentive for consumers to switch between brands, thereby encouraging competition between sellers. While intuition suggests that the gatekeeper should maximize brand mix to boost the use of its personalized pricing service, we show that an intermediate level of brand mix actually maximizes its revenue. We then demonstrate that this strategy does not minimize consumer welfare. Finally, we discuss policy interventions, such as a sufficiently stringent fee cap or enhanced surveillance of the recommendation system, that could improve consumer welfare.

Le séminaire a lieu à 13h30, en salle 227.