Ana Mauleon

Séminaire externe d'Ana Mauléon, professeur d'économie à l'Université Saint-Louis de Bruxelles, et spécialiste de la théorie des jeux, des réseaux et d'Industrial Organization

Abstract:  
We study stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption that one side of the market is myopic while the other side may contain both myopic and farsighted agents. We assume the men to be myopic and the women to be myopic or farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set, which is based on the notion of a myopic-farsighted improving path. 
A myopic-farsighted stable set is the set of matchings such that there is no myopic-farsighted improving path from any matching in the set to another matching in the set (internal stability) and there is a myopic-farsighted improving path from any matching outside the set to some matching in the set (external stability). Under the assumption that the top choice of each man is a farsighted woman, we show that the singleton consisting of the woman-optimal stable matching is a myopic-farsighted stable set, so the most farsighted side of the market is favored. We present examples where this is the unique myopic-farsighted stable set and farsighted agents are able to select their most preferred  core element. We also present examples of myopic-farsighted stable sets consisting of a core element different from the woman-optimal matching or even of a non-core element.