Nicolas Jacquemet

Nous avons le plaisir d'accueillir pour un séminaire au laboratoire GAEL le 19 mars 2020, Nicolas Jacquemet, professeur à l'école d'économie de Paris.
Ses travaux de recherche portent sur la microéconomie appliquée et sur le contenu empirique des incitations et de la théorie des jeux (méthodes expérimentales et économétrie sur des données d'observation).

Titre de la présentation : Discrete Choice under Oaths.

Résumé :
Using discrete choices to elicit preferences is a major tool to help guide public policy. Although Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) remains by far the most popular mechanism used to elicit preferences, its reliability still is questionable. Using an induced value experimental design, we show that standard benchmarks achieve no more than 56% (hypothetical answers with no monetary incentives) to 60% (real monetary incentives) of payoff maximizing choices. Herein we demonstrate that having respondents sign a the truth-telling oath reduces non-payoff maximizing choices by nearly 50% relative to these benchmarks. The explicit and voluntary commitment to honesty improved decisions. Further, we show that it is the explicit commitment to honesty induced by the truth-telling oath improves choices, not just any oath mechanism, i.e., an oath to task or to duty did not improve choices