Jean-Jacques Herings

Prof. Dr. P. Jean-Jacques Herings,Department of Microeconomics and Public Economics - School of Business and Economics

www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/sbe

• Economic Theory
• Game Theory
• Equilibrium Computation
• Finance
• Industrial Organization
• Political Economy

Title: Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players

Abstract:
We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set of matchings in the core. When myopic and farsighted players interact, it is possible that outcomes outside the core can be supported. When all men are myopic and the top choice of each man is a farsighted woman, we show that the singleton consisting of the woman-optimal stable matching is a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set. The same result holds when all women are farsighted.

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